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Identitarian Anxieties and the Nature of Inter-Tribunal
Deliberations
Adeno Addis* and Jonathan Remy Nash**

I. INTRODUCTION
On matters of judicial contacts across territorial boundaries-whether
horizontal' or vertical 2-two seemingly opposed trends define our globalized
world. On the one hand, communication technologies are making it easier for
members of judicial tribunals across the globe to get relatively quick access to
each other's judgments and opinions and to consult them for any help they
might offer about similar issues and concerns that they face. And it is
increasingly clear that with globalization in the economic, security, and political
realms, many of the issues that appear before judicial tribunals are (and will
increasingly be) similar, requiring similar--or even joint and coordinated 3responses. Indeed, we take joint and coordinated responses for granted in
relation to the executive (and even legislative) branches of government. Finance
ministers coordinate; so do foreign ministers.
On the other hand, there is loud and at times fierce resistance, at least in
some Western countries, to the proposition that national judicial tribunals may

William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School.
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Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Professor Nash was a Visiting Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago Law School for the 2007-08 academic year, and until 2008 was
Robert C. Cudd Professor of Environmental Law at Tulane Law School.
Horizontal contacts refer to contacts among national courts.

2

Vertical contacts refer to those contacts between national courts on the one hand and regional or
international tribunals on the other hand. The term "vertical" is of course not an entirely accurate
description of the relationship between national tribunals and international or regional tribunals
since it implies a monist notion of a legal landscape, but for present purposes the distinction will
do.

3

See People's Unionfor Civil Liberties & Anor v Union of India [2004] 1 LRI 1, 16 (India) ("Where
international terrorists are operating globally.. . a collective approach to terrorism is important."),
citing and endorsing the statement from Lord Wolf of the House of Lords, A and Others v Home
Department [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1502, [2004] QB.335, $ 44 (UK).
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consult foreign decisions and texts to see whether they, along with other data,
shed light on issues and concerns of a similar nature that are not unambiguously
addressed by domestic rules of decision. 4 Put simply, processes of globalization
are producing often strident nationalisms, nationalisms that view inter-tribunal
dialogues not as deepening and enriching communities, but rather as steps that
go to undermine the existence and flourishing of "communities of character," to
borrow a phrase from Michael Walzer.5 This fear is what we shall refer to as the
identitarian anxiety.
This Article attempts to do two things. First, it seeks to specify how intertribunal dialogues actually occur. Second, it explores whether dialogues or
deliberations should properly raise identitarian anxieties. The Article concludes
that identitarian anxieties are premised on faulty assumptions about how
identities-communal or national-emerge. The Article further suggests that
inter-tribunal dialogues might be a better way to understand the evolving identity
of the nation-state which continues to occur in the context of a still-evolving
international public space. 6 One will not understand the nature of national
identities if one does not fully understand the nature of international public
space and vice versa. Identities-individual as well as communal-are shaped in
the process of engaging the other And as indicated below, nations, like
individuals, are always growing, always becoming;8 they are never fully achieved.
As such, inter-tribunal dialogues contribute to the development and depth of the
community of character rather than undermining it. The Article also argues that
refusing to engage others not only will lead to partial understanding of self, but
also will result in diminished influence in the shaping of the international public
space in which one inevitably will be forced to engage.

4

See, for example, the discussion at notes 21-22.

5

Michael Walzer, Spheres ofJusice: A Defense of Pluralismand Equalio62 (Basic Books 1983).
Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court once made a similar observation. See text

6

accompanying note 46.
7

See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitaianism,and the Rights of Ethnic Minoriies, 67 Notre Dame
L Rev 615, 640-645 (1992). See generally Adeno Addis, On Human Diversio and the Limits of
Toleralion, in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, eds, Ethnidty and Group R'ghts 112 (NYU 1997).
Aharon Barak, former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was right when he noted that
"comparing oneself to others allows for greater self-knowledge .... Examining a foreign solution
may help a judge choose the best local solution .... The benefit of comparative law is in
expanding judicial thinking about the possible arguments, legal trends, and decision-making
structures available." Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democray, 116 Harv L Rev 16, 110-11 (2002).

8

After all, in relation to the US, the Framers knew that the nation was always growing, always
becoming. Their intent was to "create a more perfect union." See note 44 (noting Justice
Holmes's metaphor that the Framers tried to create "an organism").
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The Article proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the salient features of
inter-tribunal deliberative processes. Section III evaluates the goals of intertribunal deliberation and how deliberative processes are structured to try to
achieve those goals.

II. FEATURES OF A DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
Neither proponents nor opponents of inter-tribunal dialogue specify what
constitutes dialogue or deliberation' and in what sense inter-tribunal contacts or
connections could be seen as dialogic or deliberative. Not every contact or
connection will, of course, merit the designation of dialogue or deliberation.10
For there to be a genuine process of inter-tribunal deliberation or dialogue,
the following four factors must be present. First, the parties to the conversation
must assume that engaging each other will lead to the clarification of issues and
positions, a process that is more likely than not to lead to the correct or the most
defensible result. Put simply, at the heart of a genuine deliberative process is the
idea that participants' dominant motivation is the cooperative search for the
truth or 12the most defensible result." One might call this the principle of
sincerity.
A second important condition for a deliberative process is that participants
advance and defend their proposals and propositions with reasons that are
acknowledged as such by and are accessible to others. Decisions are based on
the sharing of reasons, not simply on the counting of votes or on "the counting
of noses," to borrow a phrase.' 3 One might call this reason-giving condition the
9

10

1

12

For present purposes, this Article uses the terms "dialogue" and "deliberation" interchangeably,
employing the term that seems more applicable in the particular context.
For an extended account of the requirements of a deliberative process, see generally Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton 2004). See also Adeno
Addis, Deliberative Democray in Severely Fractured Societies, 16 Ind J Global Legal Studies __
(forthcoming 2009, as part of a symposium issue on global governance). The authors here are
engaged in a larger project entitled On JudicialDeliberation that explores the special nature of the
deliberative process in the adjudicative context.
We do not deny that other motivations may enter a judge's decision-making calculus. Future work
will defend the notion that, for the judicial function to be met, judges' dominant interest should
and will be reaching the most defensible result. See Adeno Addis, 16 Ind J Global Legal Studies
(cited in note 10). Consider also Jonathan Remy Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived.Qualiyof Appellate Review, 61 Vand L Rev 1745,
1751, n 17 (2008) (arguing that, whether because of their view of themselves or otherwise, judges
on lower courts will seek to resolve legal questions "correctly").
Consider Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich L Rev
2297 (1999) (discussing the normative underpinnings and practical reality of sincere and strategic
voting on courts).

13

See Ernest Young, Foreign Law and the DenominatorProblem,119 Harv L Rev 148, 152 (2005) ("The
hallmark of persuasive authority is engagement with the reasons for a practice or a decision rather
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principle of the common pool of reason. The reason-giving requirement is a
central requirement of dialogue or deliberation. In the context of legal opinions,
14
it is what facilitates exchange, and respect, between majority and dissent.
The requirement of the common pool of reason has an informational
component and a procedural component. For there to be genuine deliberation,
especially in the context of inter-tribunal dialogue, there has to be some minimal
agreement as to what information would be validly before a judicial tribunal and
what process would be used to determine both how such information is selected
and admitted. That is, for there to be a process of inter-tribunal dialogue, there
must first be an agreement on what constitutes a judicial tribunal. It is not just
the process of reasoning that would distinguish a judicial tribunal from political
and legislative bodies, but also the manner in which the tribunal determines what
information would be validly part of its deliberation and by what process that
information should be selected and admitted. It is true that there would be some
variations among judicial tribunals both in terms of what information is admitted
and what procedure is used to determine admissibility, especially across systems
and borders. However, as a general matter, there is a commonality among
judicial tribunals not only in the manner in which they reason but also in relation
to the informational and procedural requirements that form the bases for the
deliberative process.
Third, participants of a dialogue treat each other as free and equal with their
own commitments and think that they owe one another accessible and
acceptable justifications for the conclusions and judgments that they reach. The
reasons given by one party, and the reasons offered in response by another,
must comply with this principle. One may call this the principle of reciprocity.
Fourth, decisions will lead to further dialogue and revision as participants
take into account the views of others and in the process transform their own
views and preferences. As such, deliberation transforms identities as it also
transforms views and preferences. Discourse constitutes agents as it also
constructs meaning. This is what one might refer to as the constitutive
dimension of deliberation.'"

14

is

than the counting of noses. There is no imperative to choose the most widespread practice or
rule, for example, if the minority position seems better thought out.").
See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 Cal L Rev 1, 8 (1993) (noting the persistence, and importance, of respect by dissenting
judges for the court on collegial courts).
Deliberation in relation to the judicial process refers to judges engaging not only fellow panelists,
but also other panels and judges, above, across, or below them. They engage those judges or
panels through their written opinions. The concern of this Article is the dialogue among judicial
tribunals across national or territorial boundaries conducted through engaging texts and judicial
decisions of foreign nations or international and regional tribunals.
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Having taken the time to expound upon what judicial deliberation entails, it
is appropriate and important to explain what judicial deliberation does not entail.
First, as the discussion above indicates, judicial deliberation does not entail
courts in one system being bound by rulings of courts in another system.
Neither does judicial deliberation require that a court (or a judge on a court) in
one system agree with, or even accept as relevant, the ruling or reasoning of a
court in another system.' 6 What it does require is that judgments of other courts
on a similar topic not be considered a nullity. A court considering an issue that a
court in another system has previously addressed should conceive of itself as
part of the audience to which the other court was speaking, and should consider
the other court as part of the audience to which it (the first court) is now going
to speak. 7 As Sir Basil Markesinis and J6rg Fedtke make clear, while judicial
deliberation may result in one country adopting certain legal concepts or views
from another, the fact that inter-tribunal deliberation is undertaken does not
mean that transplantation of law necessarily will, or should, take place.' 8
As an example, many have assailed Justice Scalia for failing to engage in
inter-tribunal deliberation in his dissent in Lawrence v Texas." The reason that this
characterization may be apt, however, is not because he disagreed with the
reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions, but rather because he failed to
confront the reasoning of other courts on the merits. Instead, Justice Scalia
dismissed the reasoning of other courts as a nullity,2 and thus failed to engage in
inter-tribunal deliberation.
16

See note 13.

17

One can draw a parallel to dialogue and deliberation between the federal and state courts, and
among the state courts, in the US: one court system may look to others not (necessarily) for
binding precedent, but for ideas as to how to resolve a particular legal issue.
See Sir Basil Markesinis and J6rg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist,80 Tulane L Rev 11, 17 (2005).

18
19

20

539 US 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986), and concluding that a Texas
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the US
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment).
Justice Scalia assailed the majority for looking to foreign courts' decisions decriminalizing sodomy
as a ground for its decision:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States
choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less
do they spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign
nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never relied on
"values we share with a wider civilization," but rather rejected the claimed
right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Bowers' rational-basis holding is likewise devoid
of any reliance on the views of a "wider civilization." The Court's discussion
of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta.
Dangerous dicta, however, since "this Court ... should not impose foreign
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." Foster v Florida,537 US 990, 990 n *
(2002) (Thomas concurring in denial of certiorari).
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III. INTER-TRIBUNAL DELIBERATIONS: GOALS
AND PROCESSES

A. THE GOALS OF A DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
It is fair to assume that those who seek to engage in inter-tribunal dialogue
do so in circumstances where the issue is not or cannot be unambiguously
settled by domestic rule of decision. Indeed, Steven Calabresi and Stephanie
Dotson Zimdahl have shown that the Supreme Court looks to engage foreign
decisions and laws either when the law is ambiguous or in cases where a
determination of reasonableness is required. 2' The predominant motivation for
those engaged in inter-tribunal dialogue must be the search for the correct or the
most defensible result. Under those circumstances, inter-tribunal dialogueengaging the decisions or texts of other communities-enhances the possibility
of arriving at the correct or most defensible reason.
Inter-tribunal judicial deliberation increases the chances that in the long run
more courts will arrive at better results through better reasoning. Conversely,
such deliberation reduces the likelihood that poor decisions and poor reasoning
will become ensconced.
Consider first the likelihood of arriving at better results. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem predicts that inter-tribunal deliberation will make this more likely. The
Jury Theorem provides that, where there is a question that each voter has a
greater than 50 percent chance of making the "correct" decision, then the
greater the number of voters, the more likely it is that the selection of a majority
of voters will be the "correct" answer.2 2 The Jury Theorem has been cited as a
justification for staffing courts with more than one judge.23 The Jury Theorem
Lawrence, 539 US at 598 (internal citations and quotations partially omitted). Absent from Justice
Scalia's opinion is an explanation of why, even if foreign judicial authority is not binding on US
courts or (standing alone) informative of what lies in the American history and tradition, the
reasoning of the foreign cases on which the majority relied was inapplicable to the Court's inquiry.
It is interesting to consider the full statement by Justice Thomas with respect to the denial of
certiorari in Foster from which Justice Scalia quoted: "While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to
consider the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." Foster v Florida,
537 US 990, 990 n * (2002) (Thomas concurring in denial of certiorari). Viewed in full, the
statement suggests, insofar as Congress is free to consider the actions of other nations, that the
question of valid deliberation is entirely onc of separation of powers, not identity.
21

Steven G. Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and ForeignSources of Law:
Two Hundred Years of Practiceand the Juvenile Death Penaly Decision, 47 Wm & Mary L Rev 743, 891-

22

98 (2005).
See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for TransjurisdictionalAdjudicafion, 94 Va L Rev 1869,

23

1916.
See, for example, Nash and Pardo, 61 Vand L Rev at 1748 (2008) (cited in note 11).
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also supports having more than one domestic court system opine on a legal
issue. 24 And Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have argued that the Jury Theorem
has at least some application to issues that are considered by courts from
multiple countries."i
How does deliberation affect the applicability of the Jury Theorem? On the
one hand, some commentators have suggested that the very availability of
deliberation renders the Jury Theorem inapplicable.26 On the other hand, it is the
act of deliberation that may make available to courts the benefit of the Jury
Theorem: only by considering the opinions of courts of other systems (here, the
relevant voters), after all, can a court consider the result to which a majority of
other courts have arrived.
In addition, inter-tribunal deliberation allows the Jury Theorem to apply
beyond simply outcomes, but also to reasoning. The purported invocation of the
Jury Theorem with respect to the reasoning of courts raises yet another
question. An assumption underlying the Jury Theorem is that the question at
issue has a "correct" answer. Is there a plausible sense in which one can say that
there is a "correct" line of legal reasoning that supplies an answer to a legal
question?27 If not, once again, the Jury Theorem's predictive power is on shaky
ground. Still, one suspects that, even if the Jury Theorem is not entirely
applicable, a multiplicity of courts opining on an issue will increase the likelihood
that better answers will emerge over time. Even if the Jury Theorem's predictive
power is not at its height, nonetheless the Jury Theorem's logic suggests a
benefit that arises from inter-tribunal deliberation.
On a related point, inter-tribunal deliberation will help free jurisdictions
from "stoppages" in legal evolution imposed by bad decisions. Absent intertribunal deliberation, a poor decision might persist as precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis. The application of this doctrine (which applies more
strongly in common law jurisdictions) tends to bolster the legitimacy of a court

24

See Nash, 94 Va L Rev at 1916-17 (cited in note 22).

25

See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan L Rev 131, 178-79
(2006) (arguing that the Condorcet Jury Theorem, if certain prerequisites are met, offers limited
support for the practice of considering the law of other nations in determining domestic law).
This is because the Condorcet Jury Theorem in its pure form assumes that each voter casts an

26

27

independent vote. See, for example, id at 144-45.
One can raise a similar question even with respect to the application of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem to legal questions faced by appellate courts. See, for example, Maxwell L. Stearns, The

CondorretJugy Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking:A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 Theoretical Inquiries L
125, 144-46 (2002) (arguing that the Condorcet Jury Theorem is of limited applicability to the
appellate-court setting because appellate panels bear little resemblance to juries). Another implicit
assumption is that various tribunals confront legal questions that are, if not identical, at least
analogous or closely related.
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system. 28 At the same time, as Robert Schapiro has explained, the doctrine has a
downside: it may tend to ensconce poorly reasoned decisions and undesirable
legal rules.29 This may especially be a problem for a jurisdiction's high court,
which is technically subject to overruling only by itself and the relevant
legislative body (and by constitutional amendment). Inter-tribunal deliberation
may provide an "escape valve" of sorts from stringent application of stare
decisis.30 An understanding that high courts in other systems have reached a
different conclusion (or the same conclusion based upon different reasoning)
may encourage a high court to overrule itself; even if it would eventually have
overruled itself anyway, inter-tribunal deliberation may facilitate this step.
Indeed, one might even say that such deliberation may give "cover" to a high
court, and allow it to overrule earlier decisions and reasoning without putting at
risk its legitimacy.
B. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND THE COMMON POOL
OF REASON
The principle of the common pool of reason has two dimensions, and both
must be present in the context of inter-tribunal dialogue. First, there is a
common pool of reason to the extent that dialogues among tribunals are
conducted within a structure where the form and nature of the argument is
generally familiar to participants of the dialogue. Unlike much of the political
conversation that goes on across national boundaries-which might at times be
posturing with no intention of persuading dialogue partners-structures within
which inter-tribunal dialogues are conducted are primarily intended to persuade
dialogue partners. It is standard, though not universal, practice for courts to
provide not just a ruling in a case, but the reasoning on which the ruling is
justified.3 1 Indeed, in some jurisdictions such as France, judges are subject to a

28

See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Majofi y That Wasn't: Stare Decisis, Majofioy Rule, and the Mischief of

29

Quorum Requirements, 58 Emory LJ (forthcoming 2009).
See Robert A. Schapiro, InteiurisdiclionalEnforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 Wm & Mary L
Rev 1399, 1422 (2005) ("The existence of parallel, non-intersecting lines of authority means that a
blockage or error in one will not affect the other."). But see John Ferejohn, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judidag: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S Cal L Rev 353, 363 (1999) ("[T]he
development of appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the appellate levels can be understood
as a strategy to ensure that no single judge can, by her actions alone, inflict too much damage on
the judiciary as a whole, by making aberrant or overly courageous judgments.").

30
31

Consider Nash, 94 Va L Rev at 1918 (cited in note 22).
See, for example, Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigmfor Mulimember
Courts, 56 Stan L Rev 75, 85-88 (2003). See also id at 85 n 38 (briefly describing the history of
judicial opinion writing).
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statutory reason-giving requirement.12 They are obligated to write opinions that
give reasons detailing why they came to their final conclusions.3 3
Second, when judges across jurisdictions and territorial boundaries engage
each other that encounter is likely to lead to an increase in the common pool of
reason. As Aharon Barak, the former President of the Israeli Supreme Court,
correctly noted, "The benefit of comparative law is in expanding judicial
thinking about the possible arguments, legal trends and decision-making
structures available."34 That is, the value of inter-tribunal dialogue is to open up
two possibilities that would otherwise have been unavailable: alternative ways of
being a good judge and alternative approaches to the specific issue at hand
which is likely to have triggered the initiation of the inter-tribunal dialogue.
C. RECIPROCITY AND THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
As noted above, the principle of reciprocity is essential for effective dialogic
process. Reciprocity manifests itself in a number of ways. First, it is a
disposition, an attitude. Dialogue partners have to start with the assumption that
each party is free and equal, and is owed accessible and acceptable justification
for judgments and conclusions other partners reach. Second, reciprocity may
manifest itself in that willingness and openness of one court to engage the works
of another country's court (or an international tribunal) will incline the latter to
reciprocate.
There is an element of reciprocity to inter-tribunal dialogue and deliberation.
All other things being equal, one would expect that courts that engage in
dialogue with courts in other systems would, in return, have their opinions
considered by courts in other systems. There are two reasons that justify this
expectation: one grounded in international law, and the other derived from
domestic judicial experience.
First, commentators have observed that reciprocity pervades certain aspects
of international law. For example, Thomas Merrill makes the argument with
respect to international law governing transboundary pollution.35 Notions of
reciprocity appear in international treaties and customary international law. They
Mathilde Cohen, Reason-Giving in Court Praclice: Decision-Makers at the Crossroads, 14 Colum J Eur L
77, 81 (2008) ("In France, all judges, administrative judges included, are subjected to a statutory
reason-giving requirement."). See also Nash, 56 Stan L Rev at 86 n 38 (cited in note 31) (noting
that, through its history, the state of Louisiana has at different times (i) required each Justice on
the state supreme court to write a separate opinion in each case, and (ii)banned the filing of
dissents).
33 Cohen, 14 Colum J Eur L at 81 (cited in note 32).
34 Barak, 116 Harv L Rev 16 at 111 (cited in note 7).
35 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundagy Pollulion, 46 Duke L J 931 (1997).
32
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are also featured in domestic legal provisions that offer benefits to other
countries provided that similar benefits are being received in return.
Second, consider the experience of inter-tribunal dialogue between and
among domestic courts. For example, procedural devices that foster direct
dialogue between state courts and federal courts function best when the
procedural device in question sensibly apportions responsibility and power
between the two court systems so as not to advantage substantially one system
over another.36 This is especially the case domestically with respect to the
behemoth that is the federal court system-in terms of both size and relative
power-vis-a-vis any of the state court systems: procedural devices that
emphasize the power disparity the federal court system enjoys over the state
courts tend to generate friction between the court systems and accordingly to be
less successful.
Proceeding by analogy to the international level, one would expect that
courts that engage courts from other systems in dialogue can more likely expect
to be engaged in dialogue by courts from other systems. Former US Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor seemed to have this exchange in mind
when she observed that citing foreign sources "may not only enrich our own
country's decisions; it will create that all-important good impression. When U.S.
courts are seen to be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a
rule-of-law model for other nations will be enhanced."37 The willingness of a
tribunal from one country to engage tribunals from other countries not only may
broaden the common pool of reason available for the tribunal that is consulting
the decision of a foreign court, but also will likely incline foreign tribunals to
consult the decisions of that tribunal on matters of a similar nature which may
not be unambiguously addressed by a national rule of decision.
Just as a court system's willingness to engage in dialogue likely will be met
reciprocally, and will encourage courts in other systems to address the rulings of
the first court system, so too would we expect a court system's unwillingness to
engage in dialogue to lead to a decrease in that court system's international
influence. And, indeed, there is recent evidence to support this contention. The
perception that the judiciaries of the US do not engage in dialogue with courts
from other systems appears to have made courts in other systems less willing to

36

Certification procedure, under which federal courts certify state law questions to state high courts
for resolution, does a better job in this regard than does Supreme Court certiorari review of state
court decisions on matters of federal law. See Nash, 94 Va L Rev at 1908 (cited in note 22).

37

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Address at the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct 28,
2003), available online at <www.southerncenter.org/OConnor transcript.pdf> (visited Dec 5,

2008).
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engage the courts of the US.38 Thus, even the American judiciary-the
behemoth court system on the international stage-faces reputational
consequences from an unwillingness to engage in dialogue.
There is another point that needs to be made here. Inter-tribunal dialogue
results not only in the exchange of information about concerns of a similar
nature and hence may lead to the correct or the most appropriate response to
the specific question before the court. It also leads to the creation of an
international public space in which international legal norms emerge. Refusal to
participate in that process means not having a role in the shaping of that space.
Absentees have no influence.39 This argument will of course not be persuasive to
those who think isolation is a virtue and that a nation or a community is selfsufficient on matters of norms and rules that are needed to resolve questions
and issues that might arise. However, that sentiment hardly accords with the
highly interdependent world in which we live.
D. No NEED FOR IDENTITARIAN ANXIETY
As noted above, a major source of anxiety about consulting foreign or
international law as a source of understanding domestic law is what this Article
has referred to as identitarian anxiety. The notion of identitarian anxiety can be
expressed thus: laws, especially basic laws such as constitutions, are not simply
instrumental (that is, a means of doing) but constitutive of the very identities of
communities (that is, a means of being).40 Indeed, many European scholars
following Jiirgen Habermas have attempted to capture the constitutive aspect of
basic laws by invoking the notion of "constitutional patriotism."'" Constitutional
patriotism becomes an essential source of solidarity and community in the
diverse societies that are typical of many nation-states. A constitutional patriot is
one who views the constitution of a particular territorial community as more or
less a biography of the community as a whole, and thus allegiance to the
constitution is an affirmation of the deepest and most enduring aspect of the
identity of the community.
38

39

40

41

See Adam Liptak, US Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, NY Times Al (Sept
18, 2008).
See also Nash, 58 Emory L J at (cited in note 28) (noting that the absence of judges on a
court will affect not only the outcome of the particular case, but also the deliberation undertaken
by the court).
Joseph Raz put it this way: "In large measure what we study when we study the nature of law is
the nature of our own self-understanding." Joseph Raz, Can There be a Theory of Law, in Martin
Golding and William Edmundson, eds, Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Legal Theory 324, 331
(Blackwell 2004).
For a discussion of the notion of "constitutional patriotism," see generally Symposium: Constitutional
Patriotism,6 IntlJ Con L 1, 67-152 (2008).
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To view a country's legal regime-especially its basic law-as the biography
of the specific people in which it emerges, and whose institutions and lives it is
meant to regulate, is to be skeptical of the relevance to one country of the laws
and constitutions of another. Indeed, concern over the assumption that the laws
and constitution of one country would apply in another goes further: relying on
the biographies and narrative of other peoples is either to misunderstand the
people and communities one wishes to understand or, even worse, to turn them
into what they are not and perhaps should not be.
Identitarian anxiety is thus premised on two distinct but related concerns,
each of which has to do with the loss of identity. First, one might be concerned
that the nation's core identities would be undermined by the appropriation of
norms that describe and regulate distinctly different institutional and cultural
arrangements. 42 Or, second, and just as bad if not worse, one might be
concerned that the appropriation of foreign and international norms is a first
step into the construction of a cosmopolitan world in which nations and
national identities are transcended.43
This view seems to misunderstand both the nature of identities and how
they emerge. First, it is clearly the case that national identities cannot be
understood in a vacuum, but only in the context of how they interact in an
international system of states. Indeed, we have come to accept this in relation to
the executive (and often legislative) branches of government. There is no reason
why that interaction should not include judicial dialogues. Second, and more
importantly, nations-just like individuals-are always evolving, always
becoming. They are never fully achieved. They are ongoing projects
("organisms," to cite Justice Holmes 44) that seek to develop moral and political
communities in ever more defensible and perfect ways. And that growth and
change often occurs when one engages others who might assist in serious
reflection on matters that may have simply been assumed or poorly understood.
Inter-tribunal dialogues may assist in that reflection. Third, in an increasingly
interdependent world, it may not be unreasonable to assume, as did Justice
Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court, that the laws of a country should

42

Judge Richard Posner seems to have captured the first aspect of the concern when he wrote that
"the judicial systems of the rest of the world are immensely varied" and form judicial decisions
that emerge "from a complex socio-historico-politico-institutional background of which our
judges.., are almost entirely ignorant." Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Alreadj Have Our Own
Laws, Legal Aff 40, 41-42 (July/Aug 2004).

43

Judge Posner observes: "To cite foreign law as authority is to flirt with the discredited... idea of
a universal natural law." Id at 42.

44

Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416, 433 (1920) ("It was enough for [the Framers of the US
Constitution] to realize or to hope that they had created an organism.").
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not be viewed as operating in a vacuum. Speaking of the Australian Constitution,
Justice Kirby held:
Where there is ambiguity, there is a strong presumption that the Constitution,
adopted and accepted by the people of Australia for their government, is not
intended to violate fundamental human rights and human dignity .... [iThe
Australian Constitution... does not operate in a vacuum. It speaks to the
people of Australia... [as] it also speaks to the
45 international community... [of
which] the Australian nation ... is a member.
In an interdependent world, each nation's biography can be fully understood
or written only in the context of that nation's position within the wider world.
Again, Justice Kirby, in the AI-Kateb decision, makes the point. "The fact is," he
said, "that it is often helpful for national judges to check their own constitutional
' 46
thinking against principles expressing the rules of a 'wider civilisation.'
Sometimes, a country's basic or foundational document makes clear that the
particular community's identity is to be understood in the light of the fact that it
is linked to the "family of nations."'" And courts are specifically instructed or
permitted to use international or foreign legal sources to interpret aspects of the
48
foundational document.
The point here therefore is not to deny the central role that law, especially
the basic law, plays in the formation of national identity. Law is not simply a
means of doing, it is also a means of being. Rather, the point is to contest the
proposition that the sources of national law should be exclusive if the
authenticity of national identity is to be guaranteed or maintained. In the
globalized world in which each nation exists, linked in various ways to the family
of nations, what seems inauthentic is the suggestion that each nation is selfsufficient-that it has all the norms it requires to resolve all issues that might
arise within it. To understand oneself fully is partly to engage those to whom
one is institutionally linked.

45

Kartinyeriv Commonwealth [1998] 156 ALR 300

46

AI-Kateb v Godwin [2004] 219 CLR 526

47

See S Aft Const, preamble ("We the People of South Africa ... lay the foundations for a
democratic and open society ... [that] is able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the
family of nations."). Indeed, the South African Constitution requires courts to "prefer any
reasonable interpretation of [ ] legislation that is consistent with international law over any
alternative that is inconsistent with international law." S Afr Const, § 233. There is a similar US
doctrine-the Charming Betsy canon-which Chief Justice Marshall expressed as requiring that
"an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." Murray v The Schooner Charming Betyy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
The South African Constitution requires courts to "consider international law" and gives them
the authority to "consider foreign law" when interpreting the South African Bill of Rights. S Afr
Const, § 39.
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166 (Austl).
190 (Austl) (quoting Lawrence, 539 US at 576).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The world is full of boundaries. There are boundaries that are marked by
geography, ethnicity, and legal and political culture. Whatever their natures,
boundaries provide the condition for communal or individual identities and
agencies and they make collective action possible. That very capacity to define
and contain, however, allows boundaries "to close off possibilities of being that
might otherwise flourish., 49 This is the paradox of boundaries that led one
scholar to remark that "[b]oundaries both foster and inhibit freedom."5 ° What
this Article has suggested is that inter-tribunal deliberations open up possibilities
of being that might otherwise be closed off. They become a valuable source of
understanding and shaping the identity of a nation rather than undermining it.
To equate identities with self-sufficient agencies is to misunderstand the way
identities emerge and change.

49
50

William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization 163 (Minnesota 1995).
Id.
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